















The Thesis Committee for Sarah Masimore 
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Thesis: 
 
 
















Leon W. Vanstone 
 
  








Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of  
The University of Texas at Austin 
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
 
Master of Science in Computer Science 
 
 




To my wife, family, friends, and mentors who have brought joy and meaning to my life. 






I would first like to thank my thesis adviser and mentor, Professor Chris 
Rossbach. Chris’ Advanced Operating Systems class and subsequent mentorship inspired 
me to pursue a thesis and dive deeper into the systems world. I would also like to thank 
Dr. Leon Vanstone, who is a founder and the leader of the Texas Rocket Engineering 
Lab. His thoughtful leadership has fostered a diverse and productive rocket lab that has 
given hundreds of graduate and undergraduate students the opportunity to work on and 
lead industry-level projects. Finally, I would like to thank the intelligent, kind, and 
dedicated members of the TREL Avionics Software team, who contributed to the design, 
implementation, and verification of the presented Avionics Software Platform. In 
particular I would like to thank Stefan deBruyn, Kevin Liang, Simoni Maniar, Sophia Xu, 
Jennifer Dahm, Sahil Ashar, Matthew Yu, Wilson Watson, Jonathan Baurer, and 







A Distributed Avionics Software Platform for a Liquid-Fueled Rocket 
Sarah Masimore, M.S.COMP.SC. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020 
 
Supervisor:  Christopher J. Rossbach 
 
A distributed avionics software platform was developed as part of the Texas 
Rocket Engineering Lab’s efforts to become the first university lab to launch a liquid-
fueled rocket to the edge of space (100km) and recover it successfully. There are four 
flight computers on the rocket, each running a real-time version of Linux and connected 
over an Ethernet network. The Avionics Software Platform runs on all flight computers, 
providing data handling, thread scheduling, clock synchronization, software error 
handling, and control logic abstractions for the rocket’s avionics system. The Platform 
executes the rocket’s control logic and device drivers at 100Hz, with only 6.2% of the 
total CPU time dedicated to Platform functions. The requirements, design, and 
verification of the Avionics Software Platform are presented in this thesis. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
For the first time since the Space Shuttle program, the NewSpace movement 
marks a step change in expanding access to space and improving launch vehicle and 
spacecraft technology. Key drivers of the NewSpace movement have been private 
companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin, who have successfully developed reusable 
launch vehicles that can reach orbital or suborbital spaceflight. Reusability of launch 
vehicles has greatly reduced the cost of accessing space, and as a result new industries 
have emerged in areas such as satellite imaging and internet systems as well as 
commercial space flight. 
This new fleet of reusable and low-cost launch vehicles all have a common and 
fundamental design feature: they are liquid-fueled rather than solid-fueled rockets. A 
liquid-fueled rocket uses a liquid fuel (e.g. methane) and a liquid oxidizer (e.g. 
cryogenically cooled oxygen) to fuel the rocket. These propellants are fed from tanks on 
the rocket to the engine via tubing, regulators, and control valves. The rocket’s thrust can 
be regulated (even stopped and restarted) by controlling the flow of the propellants to the 
engine. This capability has enabled SpaceX and Blue Origin to deliver a payload to 
space, reignite their rocket engines on descent, land the rocket, and reuse the same rocket 
multiple times. A solid-fueled rocket, on the other hand, uses a mixture of solid fuel and 
solid oxidizer. Since the fuel does not require a cryogenic environment or plumbing to 
feed liquids into the engine, the rocket can be much simpler. Solid-fueled rockets, 
however, do not easily allow regulation or precise control of the rocket’s thrust and are 
therefore much more difficult to reuse. While liquid-fueled rockets are more complex to 
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develop, companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin have demonstrated that the significant 
cost reduction per launch enabled by a high-level of reusability is well worth it. 
1.1 THE TEXAS ROCKET ENGINEERING LAB 
The Texas Rocket Engineering Lab (TREL) is a research laboratory at the 
University of Texas at Austin. TREL was founded in the fall of 2018 in partnership with 
Firefly Academy, a nonprofit organization run by Firefly Aerospace. The mission of 
TREL is to develop capable professionals to meet the needs of new space, commercial 
launch, and NASA [1]. The lab is composed of about 150 graduate and undergraduate 
students and is currently focused on designing, building, and testing an approximately 30-
foot, liquid-fueled rocket named Halcyon as part of the Base 11 Space Challenge. The 
Base 11 Space Challenge is a $1 million+ prize for a student-led university team to 
design, build, and launch a liquid-propelled, single-stage rocket to an altitude of 100 
kilometers (the Karman Line) by December 30, 2021 [2]. 
1.2 HALCYON 
Halcyon is a liquid-fueled, single-stage rocket designed to reach a flight apogee of 
122km, an altitude higher than the 100km boundary of space. The rocket is currently 
being designed and developed by TREL as part of the Base 11 Space Challenge. The 
rocket’s engine is pressure-fed propellant from its tanks using valves and regulators to 
control the flow. Once the engine is ignited, the rocket’s attitude is controlled using a 
thruster-based reaction control system and actuated fins. On descent, a series of three 
parachutes is used to recover the rocket safely. Except for an operator-commanded abort, 
the rocket is designed to be 100% automated during flight.  
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There are 8 subsystems on the rocket. The Structures subsystem includes the 
rocket’s airframe, tanks, fins, electronics enclosures, and final integration of all flight 
hardware. The Propulsion subsystem includes the rocket’s engine, including the igniter, 
injector, nozzle, and associated cooling systems. The Fluids subsystem manages all fluids 
in the system, including the plumbing that feeds fuel and oxidizer to the rocket’s engine 
and reaction control system. The Recovery subsystem is responsible for the rocket’s nose 
cone and parachute system for recovering the rocket safely and intact. The Payload 
subsystem includes the payload that will be deployed at apogee. The Guidance, 
Navigation, and Control (GNC) subsystem is responsible for the control algorithms that 
manage the stability and flight path of the rocket. The Avionics Hardware subsystem 
includes electronic hardware on the rocket, including power, telemetry transceiver, 
sensors, and actuators, while the Avionics Software subsystem is responsible for the 
flight computers, onboard communications network, and all software on the rocket. 
1.2.1 Avionics Software Subsystem 
The Avionics Software subsystem on the rocket is broken down into two layers. 
First, the Avionics Software Platform layer provides the high-level architecture of the 
rocket’s software systems, including the flight computers, flight network, operating 
system, data handling, and control abstractions for the rocket. The Platform is designed to 
be configurable so that it can be used without modification for various iterations of the 
Halcyon rocket and future TREL rockets. Second, the Avionics Software Subsystem 
layer runs on top of the Platform, defining the rocket’s control logic and drivers (e.g. 
parachute deploy logic and igniter device drivers). The Avionics Software Platform is the 
focus of this thesis. 
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1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis is structured as follows. First, the requirements for the Avionics 
Software Platform are presented. Second, the Platform’s design is described. This chapter 
includes the rationale behind high-level system decisions such as the distributed 
architecture, flight computer, and network protocol. Third, the testing and performance 
measurements of the implemented system are presented. Finally, opportunities for future 




Chapter 2: Requirements 
2.1 USE CASES 
In order to define a set of system requirements for the Avionics Software 
Platform, a list of representative use cases was first collected from the rocket’s 
subsystems. A use case for the rocket is defined as an interaction between a subsystem or 
ground operator and the Platform. The following use cases represent 10 key interaction 
types: 
1. Parachute Deployment: The Recovery subsystem reads an altitude sensor value 
indicating that a parachute should be deployed within the next few seconds via 
igniting a black powder charge. This use case describes the need for subsystem 
software to automatically read sensors, run control logic, and command actuators.  
2. Rocket Attitude Control: GNC subsystem reads various rocket sensors, which 
indicate the rocket’s attitude is off course, and must set new fin target angles 
within 50 milliseconds. Describes subsystem need to run high-level control logic 
that manages various components of the rocket.  
3. Single Fin Control: A single fin requires a software control loop running at a high 
frequency to reach and maintain the fin’s target angle against environmental 
factors. Describes subsystem need to run low-level control logic that manages a 
single rocket component at a high frequency.  
4. Coordinated Rocket Control: Valves, attitude control mechanisms, and ignition 
must be coordinated to provide stable control of the rocket. Describes the need to 
coordinate the timing of actions across the rocket within some acceptable timing 
variability. 
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5. Telemetry Transmission to Ground: Ground operators use a low-latency telemetry 
stream to prepare for launch, monitor the rocket during flight, and recover the 
rocket. Describes the need to integrate with ground systems and provide snapshots 
of the entire system’s state throughout the rocket’s day-of-launch activities.  
6. Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) Verification: Test team runs system-level tests using 
a HIL test harness and requires telemetry data throughout to verify that the 
integrated avionics software system behaves as expected. Describes the need for 
continuous streaming of system state snapshots in a testing environment. 
7. Pre-Launch Preparations: To prepare and OK the rocket to launch, sensors must 
be enabled, telemetry stream active, pre-launch tests run, and all actuators set to a 
stable state. Describes the need for constant data monitoring of the system and the 
capability to test and directly control actuators before launch. Similar need exists 
during the rocket recovery phase. 
8. Automated Abort: If a fault occurs, the system needs to automatically activate the 
Flight Termination System (FTS). Describes the need to automatically monitor 
the health of the system and change the system’s state to an abort state.  
9. Ground Operator Commands Abort: Ground operators may transmit the abort 
command to the rocket, which results in FTS activation. Describes the need to 
change the system’s state via an operator command.  
10. Flight Computer Failure: Strong desire to have redundancy so that the rocket can 






From these use cases the following Platform requirements were derived: 
 
• The flight software shall be deterministic. 
Given the same inputs and assuming 100% network reliability, the flight software 
must produce the same output every time. This is required to debug, test, and qualify the 
flight software. Otherwise, if the flight software passes a test, there is no guarantee that 
the software will pass the identical test again in the future. This applies to both software 
running on a single flight computer and any coordination between flight computers in a 
distributed setting.  
 
• Network reliability shall be at least 99.999% in the nominal case. 
Network reliability in this requirement is defined by the percentage of messages 
successfully sent by the sender node and successfully received by the receiver node 
within a usable time period. This reliability metric detects dropped or delayed messages. 
While network communications between flight computers cannot be guaranteed to be 
deterministic (e.g. a message could be dropped due to electrical interference and a 
subsequent checksum error), message drops must occur less than .001% of the time. This 
is essential for the system to be able to react quickly to new data and to minimize non-
determinism in the system caused by dropped or delayed messages. In this requirement 
the nominal case is defined as all nodes, the network switch, and network connections 
being functional. If any of these components are not functional, network reliability will 
be significantly degraded. At 99.999% reliability, the Platform is providing a guarantee 
that no more than 1 out of every 100,000 messages will be dropped or delayed beyond 
usability. 
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• The flight software shall have a reaction time of no more than 50ms for high-level 
control logic and 10ms for low-level control logic. 
Reaction time is defined as the time between new sensor data being available and 
an updated actuator value being set based on that new sensor data. This requirement is 
primarily informed by the GNC team, which is responsible for writing the control 
algorithms that react to the environment and guide the rocket to apogee. There are two 
levels of control logic with different reaction time requirements. First, high-level control 
logic is responsible for managing the overall rocket, relying on multiple sensors and 
setting target values for multiple actuators. For example, the GNC team reads multiple 
IMU’s and barometers to determine the position and attitude of the rocket and commands 
multiple fins and the reaction control system to modify the rocket’s position and attitude. 
Second, low-level control logic manages a single actuator. For example, high-level 
control logic sets a target angle for all fins, and low-level control logic makes sure the fin 
is set to that angle. While high-level control logic can tolerate a reaction time of up to 
50ms, the low-level control logic requires a faster reaction time of up to 10ms to maintain 
stability of the rocket. 
 
• The flight software shall run control logic and hardware drivers at a frequency of 
100Hz. 
The frequency at which the control logic and hardware drivers run directly 
impacts the rocket’s reaction time. Similar to the reaction time requirement above, this 
requirement is primarily informed by the GNC team. Spacecraft like the Space Shuttle 
ran their software loops at 25Hz in order to maintain stability and control of the 
spacecraft [3]. Because Halcyon is significantly smaller than the Space Shuttle, Halcyon 
can destabilize more quickly, meaning the frequency the control logic runs must be 
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higher. While 100Hz may end up being faster than the GNC team requires for controlling 
Halcyon, based on the team’s simulations this frequency is guaranteed to satisfy their 
needs.  
 
• The flight software shall support up to 100 sensors and 100 actuators. 
This requirement is informed by all subsystems on the rocket. As a liquid-fueled, 
actively controlled rocket, a large number of sensors are required to understand the state 
of the rocket for both control and engineering feedback purposes. Similarly, a large 
number of actuators are required to control things like valves, igniters, fins, power 
systems, and the reaction control system. While it is unlikely Halcyon will require 100 
sensors and 100 actuators, it is guaranteed that the subsystems in aggregate will not need 
more than this number. The number as well as the types of sensors and actuators 
supported by the Platform is bounded by the system’s network bandwidth, physical I/O, 
and CPU availability. This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
 
• The flight software shall support configurable system states.  
A state machine is an effective and intuitive way of representing the complexities 
of a system’s behavior, and is therefore a common abstraction used to manage a system’s 
state. Each state represents a grouping of related activities (e.g. running through pre-flight 
sensor tests, controlling the rocket to apogee, executing an abort sequence), as well as a 
list of transition conditions (e.g. pre-flight tests complete). If a transition condition is met, 
the system transitions to a new state. Additionally, a state machine provides a clean way 
to ensure certain safety rules are not violated throughout flight. For instance, parachute 
deployment must never be armed before engine ignition, as it is a safety hazard for 
ground personnel. This can easily be enforced using a state machine by only arming the 
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deployment system in a post-launch state. For these reasons, Halcyon is required to use a 
state machine. Since the exact state machine used by Halcyon will change frequently 
during development and testing, states must be easily configurable. 
 
• The flight software shall support user-commanded, time-based, and flight data-based 
state transitions. 
Launch operators are required as a part of the Base 11 requirements to be able to 
initiate an abort sequence at any point. The rocket’s state machine therefore must support 
operator commanded transitions to an abort state. An operator command will also be 
required to initiate the final launch sequence. During all other operations, the system 
must transition through the rocket’s states using time-based logic (e.g. after running a 60 
second pre-flight test) and data-based logic (e.g. a flag indicating apogee has been 
reached). 
 
• The flight software shall provide a mechanism for streaming snapshots of the rocket's 
state with a latency of no more than 30ms. 
Launch and recovery operators must have insight into the rocket’s state in order to 
verify nominal conditions for launch, command an abort, and verify the rocket is safe to 
approach after flight. Furthermore, if the rocket fails, having snapshots of the rocket’s 
state is critical to investigating a failure. The flight software must therefore support 
streaming snapshots of the rocket’s state throughout the mission. This snapshot data will 
be streamed over a physical connection during pre-flight operations and over a 
transceiver during flight and recovery operations. Before flight, the rocket’s entire state 
must be streamed. During flight and recovery operations, the telemetry data bandwidth 
will be bound by the transceiver hardware. In the case of a failure, a low latency is 
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critical to investigators having as much data as possible before the telemetry systems are 
destroyed. It is desired that the overall latency is no more than 50ms due to how quickly a 
rocket can fail, and 30ms of latency in the software gives the transceiver hardware an 
additional 20ms to meet this desired overall latency. The Avionics Software team is 
responsible for the software mechanisms involved in streaming telemetry, and the 
Avionics Hardware team is responsible for the physical mechanisms (e.g. a transceiver). 
 
• All flight software shall detect and handle all software errors such that the system 
transitions to a predefined state. 
If a software component fails, the failure needs to be detected and handled 
appropriately depending on what error has occurred and when in the mission it has 
occurred. This requirement is specifically related to software errors (e.g. a scheduling 
deadline is missed, a bad parameter is passed, an exception is thrown), rather than rocket 
errors (e.g. a tank temperature is too high or a sensor is returning no data). While the 
Platform does provide abstractions to detect and handle these types of rocket errors, the 
specific rocket error detection and handling logic is part of the Avionics Software 
Subsystem layer. It is important to note that this requirement is not a fault tolerance 
requirement. Handling an error in this case means making an explicit decision on what to 
do when the error occurs. For some errors, this may mean logging the error and 
continuing, and for others it may mean initiating an abort. 
2.2.1 Exclusion of a System-Level Fault Tolerance Requirement 
There are many failure points in an avionics system. A flight computer could 
become unresponsive, a network switch could lose power, a sensor could start producing 
faulty data, a connector could come loose, or a software bug could cause undefined 
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behavior. Depending on the consequence of a rocket’s failure (e.g. risk to human life or 
destruction of a billion dollar satellite) and the system’s time, mass, and financial budget, 
various fault tolerance strategies have been employed in the space industry. The Space 
Shuttle, for example, had four redundant flight computers and a fifth independently 
programmed backup flight computer in case the four redundant flight computers suffered 
from a common mode software bug [4]. Launch vehicles and spacecraft commonly use 
what is known as a 3-string architecture, where all avionics components are triplicated to 
tolerate byzantine as well as component fail-stop failures. 3-string architectures are 1-
fault tolerant, meaning they can tolerate any single component failing and still be able to 
complete the mission. A single-string architecture does not implement system-wide 
redundancy and is therefore 0-fault tolerant, however the architecture as a result is much 
simpler. 
A system-level fault tolerance requirement was intentionally excluded from the 
Platform requirements due to the additional financial, mass, and development time cost. 
However, redundancy is added at the component-level. As more is learned about the 
failure modes and failure rates of the various avionics hardware and software components 
via stress and environmental testing, redundancy is added to specific components. This 
strategy allows for a more cost-effective approach to redundancy, although the trade-off 
is that the system as a whole is not 1-fault tolerant. An additional risk of taking this 
approach is that component failure risks may be discovered late in the development of the 
Platform, making it more difficult to modify the system. To mitigate this risk, a 
significant amount of effort has been applied to developing a simple, well-documented, 
and highly modular Avionics Software Platform, as well as following a strategy of testing 
early and often. Furthermore, the iterative software development lifecycle used by the 
Avionics Software team facilitates a test and learn cycle and sets the expectation that the 
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flight software will change as it is tested and integrated into the rocket. This helps the 
team avoid the sunk cost fallacy and remain willing to change or even throw away 
previously implemented software that is shown to be insufficient in testing.   
2.3 REQUIREMENTS VERIFICATION 
Each Avionics Software Platform requirement must be verifiable and have a 
corresponding verification strategy. The following verification techniques are used to 
verify the Platform with a verification strategy for each requirement shown in Table 1: 
 
• Safety-Critical Coding Standard 
All avionics software that will fly on the rocket is required to follow an industry-
level coding standard. Coding standards include style and documentation guidelines as 
well as software patterns to follow or avoid when writing software for safety-critical 
systems. The selected coding standard is High-Integrity C++ developed by Perforce, 
which is also used by SpaceX’s flight software team [5]. The standard is enforced in code 
review and will be enforced using static analysis later this year. The selection of C++ as 
the flight software programming language is discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
• Code Review 
All flight software code additions, removals, and modifications are required to be 
reviewed and approved by another member of the Avionics Software team. Code 
reviewers validate the design and verify the implementation against component 
requirements; they check for adherence to the safety-critical coding standards and ensure 
documentation is present and understandable throughout the code; and they verify the 
automated unit and integration tests sufficiently exercise both the success and failure 
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cases of the software. Software is version-controlled using git with a protected master 
branch so that code review is required before any changes can be merged.  
 
• Unit Testing 
All flight software components are required to have a corresponding unit test suite 
written using an automated unit testing framework. A unit test suite is a set of tests 
designed to verify a specific software component’s success and failure cases. An example 
unit test would be executing a function with invalid parameters and checking that the 
function returns an expected error status. Another example would be executing the same 
function with valid parameters and checking that the function returns a success status and 
the software’s state changes as expected. An automated unit testing framework is a tool 
that enables these unit tests to be written in software and automatically run via a script. 
The Avionics Software team uses Cpputest, a unit testing framework and memory leak 
detection tool commonly used for C and C++ embedded projects. The automated nature 
of the test framework allows the unit test suites to also serve as regression tests, as all unit 
tests must run successfully before a new code change can be merged into master. 
 
• Integration Testing 
Integration tests are designed to test the behavior of multiple software 
components working together in an integrated setting. An example integration test for the 
Avionics Software Platform is testing the software running on a single flight computer, 





• System Testing 
A system test is designed to test the entire Avionics Software Platform system 
running across all flight computers. Various versions of the Avionics Software 
Subsystem layer are run on top of the Platform layer to test different features of the 
Platform. This testing technique includes testing multiple rocket subsystems together 
(e.g. Platform & Recovery Subsystem, Platform & Ground Infrastructure). The telemetry 
stream is used to verify the results of the test. 
 
• System Profiling 
System profiling is done to measure the Platform’s overall performance. To 
profile the Platform, custom Subsystem layers are designed to non-intrusively measure 
various features of the Platform. For example, a simple Subsystem layer is designed to 
measure the system’s reaction time by measuring how long it takes for an actuator to be 
commanded based on new sensor data. 
 
• Hardware-In-the-Loop (HIL) Testing 
HIL testing is the highest fidelity flight software test that can be done without 
actually launching the rocket. A HIL tool sends electronic signals to the flight computers 
to simulate sensors and then reads the flight computer electrical outputs and telemetry to 
verify the system is functioning as expected. The Avionics Software team is currently 
building a HIL test platform, which will be used for final qualification of the flight 





• Static Analysis 
Static analysis tools inspect software without executing the code. This technique 
can detect issues such as an out-of-bounds array access or unhandled exception. 
Furthermore, adherence to the High Integrity C++ coding standards can be verified. 
Static analysis of the flight software will be done later this year. 
 
Requirement Verification Strategy 
The flight software shall be 
deterministic. 
• Code Review: Check for dependencies on non-
determinism, such as time or random number. 
• Unit & Integration Testing: System output for 
every run must be the same, assuming 100% 
network reliability. 
Network reliability shall be at least 
99.999% in the nominal case. 
• System Profiling: Measure % of messages sent 
that are successfully received over a time 
period of 2x the expected mission time. 
The flight software shall have a 
reaction time of no more than 50ms 
for high-level control logic and 
10ms for low-level control logic. 
• System Profiling: Determine the maximum 
reaction time of the system. 
The flight software shall run control 
logic and hardware drivers at a 
frequency of 100Hz. 
• Integration & System Testing: The Platform 
must be able to run at 100Hz without missing 
its 10ms deadline. 
• System Profiling: Run the Platform for 2x the 
expected mission time and verify no deadline 
misses. 
The flight software shall support up 
to 100 sensors and 100 actuators. 
• System Profiling: Compare network 
bandwidth, flight computer physical I/O, and 
CPU time availability to that required to 
support 100 sensors and 100 actuators. 
The flight software shall support 
configurable system states. 
• Unit, Integration, & System Testing: Verify the 
Platform’s state machine’s ability to run 
various configured states. 
 
Table 1: Continued on next page. 
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The flight software shall support 
user-commanded, time-based, and 
flight data-based state transitions. 
• Unit, Integration, & System Testing: Verify the 
state machine’s ability to transition state based 
on user commands, time elapsed, and arbitrary 
flight data. 
The flight software shall provide a 
mechanism for streaming snapshots 
of the rocket's state with a latency 
of no more than 30ms. 
• Integration & System Testing: Verify the 
Platform streams snapshots of the rocket’s 
state. 
• System Profiling: Determine the maximum 
latency of the rocket’s state snapshots. 
All flight software shall detect and 
handle all software errors such that 
the system transitions to a 
predefined state. 
• Code Review: Verify Platform error detection 
and handling patterns are implemented. Check 
for unhandled exceptions and verify safety-
critical standards are followed. 
• Unit & Integration & System Testing: Verify 
Platform handles software errors. 
• Static Analysis: Check for unhandled 
exceptions and that safety-critical standards are 
followed.   
Table 1: Platform Requirements and Verification Strategy. 
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Chapter 3:  Design 
The following chapter describes the Avionics Software Platform’s design, 
including design goals, the selected development life cycle, and system architecture. 
3.1 DESIGN GOALS 
The first step in moving from the Avionics Software Platform requirements to a 
system architecture was establishing a set of five design goals to guide design decisions. 
The first design goal is scalability. Halcyon’s subsystem requirements are in continual 
flux as teams go through their own test and learn cycles. As such, the Platform should be 
able to scale up or down to meet CPU and I/O needs of the subsystems without requiring 
a fundamental design change.  
The second design goal is modularity. A modular system, whose complexity and 
functionality is split across discrete and simple modules, is easier to design, develop, test, 
and modify. Additionally, the Platform will go through iterations as the software and 
hardware is tested. It is critical, therefore, that the system be modifiable. Modularity 
helps ensure this. 
The third design goal is to avoid over-engineering. Over-engineering the Avionics 
Software Platform to satisfy every possible “what if” scenario and optimized against 
every system metric will result in a complex system that is difficult to understand, 
develop, and test. Instead, the system is strictly designed to handle only known scenarios. 
The tradeoff is that as the Platform goes through test and learn loops, some of the “what 
if” scenarios previously considered but not included in the design will turn out to be 
known scenarios. While it can be more difficult to add features later in a system’s 
development lifecycle, the Platform’s emphasis on modularity and avoiding over-
engineering results in a simpler design that is easier to modify when necessary. 
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The fourth design goal is configurability. As the overall rocket design matures, 
many aspects will change. In particular the number and types of sensors and actuators 
used, the exact behavior of the state machine, hardware calibration values, and control 
logic parameters will change. The Platform software components are therefore designed 
to be configurable to facilitate these types of changes.  
The final design goal is testability. The Platform must be testable at the unit, 
integration, and system level to ensure the system correctly implements desired behavior. 
The easier it is to test a system, the more the system will be tested. This means the system 
and supporting test tools must be designed so that adding test cases and verifying system 
behavior is trivial.  
3.2 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE 
The Avionics Software team follows an iterative software development life cycle. 
An iterative model uses the waterfall approach (requirements → design → develop → 
test → deploy) over multiple iterations. This approach has the benefits of thorough 
design, development, and test phases, while also providing the flexibility to iterate on the 
system’s design over time and integrate feedback from software and hardware testing into 
future iterations. The initial iteration of the Platform, for example, was the minimum 
viable product (MVP) that included data handling, a single control logic abstraction, and 
I/O capabilities. The next iteration included a state machine, clock synchronization, and 
operator command capabilities, as well as improvements in networking reliability to 
address issues discovered during network testing. 
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3.3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 The Platform uses a single-string, distributed avionics architecture. A single-
string architecture provides no system-wide fault tolerance, however it allows for a 
simpler and more cost-effective system. A distributed architecture uses multiple flight 
computers (or nodes) that work together to meet the system’s I/O and CPU requirements. 
While using a single, more powerful flight computer would be simpler, there are three 
key benefits to using a distributed architecture. First, a distributed architecture can scale 
up or down to meet I/O and CPU needs by adding or removing nodes. While designed to 
run on multiple flight computers, the Platform can also scale down to running on a single 
computer. Second, using many cheaper, less powerful flight computers instead of a 
single, more expensive and more powerful flight computer allows the Avionics Software 
team to reduce resource contention during development. Developing and testing much of 
Halcyon’s flight software requires running the software on a physical flight computer, so 
using many cheaper flight computers facilitates parallel development and testing. Finally, 
industry-scale rockets typically use distributed architectures, and building experience 
working in these complex systems is critical to preparing TREL software engineers for 
industry. 
3.3.1 Parent-Child Model 
In a distributed architecture the role of each node and their relationship to every 
other node must be defined. The Platform uses a parent-child model, where there is a 
single parent node and multiple child nodes, each running on their own flight computer 
(Figure 1). The parent node coordinates all child node actions, and the child nodes 
communicate only with the parent node. The parent node in the Platform architecture is 
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called the Control Node, and its primary role is to manage the overall system and execute 
the rocket’s high-level control logic. 
There are two types of child nodes. The first is a Device Node, whose primary 
role is to interface with the rocket’s sensor and actuator devices. A Device Node’s 
secondary role is to execute low-level control logic, for example running a PID controller 
to manage the angle of a fin. This is possible as long as the sensors and actuators used by 
the controller (e.g. the fin’s angle sensor and motor) are directly connected to the same 
Device Node. The Platform is designed to support up to three Device Nodes on the 
rocket. With every additional Device Node, the system adds I/O and CPU capabilities. 
However, each additional node also means spending more time synchronizing data across 
the system. Selecting three Device Nodes as the maximum supported enables the 
Platform to satisfy the 100 sensors and 100 actuators requirement through sufficient 
physical I/O, while still meeting the 100Hz loop frequency requirement.  
The second type of child node is called a Ground Node. Unlike the Control Node 
and Device Nodes, which run on flight computers on the rocket, the Ground Node runs 
on a ground computer. The Ground Node is used by ground operators to receive 
telemetry from and send commands to the rocket. During launch preparations the Control 
Node communicates with the Ground Node over the flight network, and during the flight 
and recovery phases communication between the two nodes is done over a transceiver. 
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Figure 1: Parent-Child Distributed Architecture. 
The parent-child model was chosen to simplify coordination between nodes and 
to increase determinism in the system. It is much easier to design, develop, debug, and 
test a distributed system that has a single coordinator rather than a distributed system with 
all nodes running independently. A system with a single coordinator can deterministically 
control things like network traffic, data synchronization across nodes, and when each 
node runs. Additionally, the splitting of node roles between control and device nodes 
follows a similar pattern used in other spacecraft, such as SpaceX’s Dragon vehicle 
which relies on remote input/output modules to interface with hardware devices [6]. 
3.3.2 Flight Software Loops 
The Control Node and Device Nodes execute their control logic and device 
drivers in synchronized, single-threaded 100Hz loops (Figure 2). The loops are 
synchronized by the Control Node so that they start at approximately the same time, 
increasing determinism in the system. A single-threaded loop for each node was chosen 
to avoid the complexities of a multi-threaded environment, where careful synchronization 
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between threads is required to prevent race conditions and deadlock. While a single-
threaded environment is simpler, it is also typically less efficient, since the software 
cannot be parallelized. This is a perfect example of where the “Avoid Over-Engineering” 
design goal guides the design decision. There is no evidence that the system requires the 
efficiency of a multi-threaded environment, so the simpler, single-threaded design is 
selected.  
Since the sensors, actuators, and control logic are distributed across flight 
computers, regular synchronization of the system’s data is required to ensure each 
computer has the information it needs to run its loop. At the top of each loop, data across 
the system is synchronized. After data synchronization is complete, the Control Node 
sends telemetry to the Ground Node, receives an optional operator command, and runs 
the state machine and high-level control logic. The Device Nodes, on the other hand, read 





Figure 2: Platform Architecture. 
3.3.3 Flight Network 
The flight network is implemented using Ethernet in a star topology (Figure 2). In 
a star topology all nodes are connected via a central connection point. As compared to 
using an Ethernet bus topology, a star topology is simpler to implement (use an Ethernet 
switch as the central point) and ensures there are no message collisions. A CAN 
(Controller Area Network) bus was considered as an alternative to Ethernet, since more 
engineers on the team had experience with CAN. However, in order to support 100 
sensors and 100 actuators, the Platform requires a bandwidth of at least 1.3 Mbps 
(assuming each sensor and actuator requires an average of 64 bits of data and data is 
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synchronized each loop). CAN only supports up to 1 Mbps, while Ethernet can typically 
support up to 1 Gbps. 
3.3.4 Flight Computer and Runtime Environment 
National Instrument (NI) single-board controllers were selected as Halcyon’s 
flight computers. Specifically, the NI sbRIO-9637 model was selected (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Flight Computer – NI sbRIO-9637. 
The sbRIO is a compact, high-performance embedded computer, with the following CPU 
and I/O specifications: 
• 667 MHz dual-core ARM processor 
• 512 MB volatile memory 
• 512 MB non-volatile memory 
• Programmable Xilinx FPGA 
• 1 Gigabit Ethernet 
• 16 single-ended analog inputs (or 8 differential) 
• 4 analog outputs 
• 28 bidirectional digital I/O channels 
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• 2 RS-232 serial ports 
• 1 RS-485 serial port 
 
While the sbRIO is not space-rated, it has been used successfully in space in 
CubeSats [7]. The sbRIO will undergo environmental stress testing later this year to 
determine acceptable temperature, vibrational, and pressure bounds. An enclosure 
designed by the Structures subsystem will be used to maintain an acceptable environment 
throughout flight. 
Using an NI controller also allows the team to take advantage of the NI tool stack, 
including LabVIEW for programming the FPGA and NI’s fork of Linux called NI Linux 
Real-Time. NI Linux Real-Time currently uses the 4.14.87 Linux kernel with the 
PREEMPT_RT patch, which allows Linux to run more like a real-time operating system. 
Real-time operating systems are used for systems that have strict timing guarantees (e.g. 
running a software loop at 100Hz). A version of Linux was the preferred operating 
system for the Avionics Software team as it is open-sourced, has a large user base, and 
comes with useful utilities. A version of Linux with the PREEMPT_RT patch is also used 
by SpaceX flight computers, demonstrating the successful application of Linux as a 
rocket’s operating system [8]. 
The flight software is run as a single application in the user space on each flight 
computer. The software is written in C++11, which allows for object-oriented 
programming as well as direct control of memory management. The 11 version of C++ is 
used as it has been widely used in embedded systems and the nuances and issues of the 
version are well-understood. One nuance of the sbRIO is that all digital and analog I/O is 
connected to the CPU through the FPGA. The FPGA is primarily programmed using 
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LabVIEW to give the CPU direct access to the I/O as well as to run protocols such as 
I2C.  
3.3.5 Software Components 
The Platform provides 5 key functions:  
1. Data handling capabilities to efficiently move data around the system, 
synchronize flight computer data, and stream telemetry to the Ground Node. 
2. Control logic abstractions for the Avionics Software Subsystem layer to 
implement state machine logic, control algorithms, and device drivers.  
3. Managing time so that the flight software has a monotonic, linear, and globally 
relevant clock that will not overflow.  
4. Software error handling to detect, surface, and handle software errors. 
5. Scheduling the flight software application on the CPU so that jitter and deadline 
misses are minimized. 
To achieve a modular design these five Platform functions are split across 15 Platform 




Chapter 4:  Verification 
The following chapter describes the testing and performance of the Avionics 
Software Platform. The system requirements are then verified using the testing and 
performance results.  
4.1 TESTING 
4.1.1 Unit Testing 
Each Platform software component has a header file that documents the 
component’s behavior. Unit testing is used to test individual Platform software 
components against this documented behavior. Each component has a corresponding test 
suite, which is used to verify the component and as regression testing whenever a new 
code change is introduced to the Platform. The unit tests are implemented using Cpputest, 
a unit testing framework and memory leak detection tool. 
Overall, the Avionics Software Platform unit test package includes 235 success 
and failure test cases with 11k test assertions, an average of 15 test cases and 733 test 
assertions per software component. Statement coverage was measured using the gcov 
utility and showed 90.7% statement coverage for the Platform. The remaining uncovered 
statements were manually reviewed and almost entirely attributed to unreachable error 
handling code when making system calls (e.g. interfacing with sockets or files). In order 
for these lines to be reachable, the system calls will need to be stubbed to force an error 
to be returned.  
Two unexpected results came out of the Platform unit tests, both related to testing 
the flight computer’s FPGA. The first was a memory leak detected by Cpputest. This 
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turned out to be a known issue with NI’s FPGA software, where a negligible amount of 
memory is leaked once per initialization of the FPGA [9]. This is not an issue for the 
flight software as the FPGA is initialized only once, so the memory leak is ignored. The 
second unexpected result was that the digital I/O pins float at a voltage of around .7V 
during FPGA initialization. On the rocket many of the digital I/O pins will be connected 
to igniters that are responsible for detonating black power during the recovery phase of 
the mission. Testing showed that the floating digital I/O pins could detonate the black 
powder, which is a significant safety risk to both personnel and the rocket. There is no 
known software fix for this issue, so a pulldown resistor is required to be used for all 
actuators relying on a digital signal to actuate. 
4.1.2 Integration Testing 
Integration testing is done to verify the integrated Platform running on a single 
flight computer. This is distinct from system testing, where the entire Platform is running 
on multiple flight computers. Integration testing is done by running the Control Node or 
Device Node software on CPU 1 and simulating the other flight and ground computers on 
CPU 0. Loopback IP addresses are used to communicate between the software under test 
and the simulated nodes. Both success and error cases (e.g. a network message being 
dropped, clock synchronization failing, etc…) are tested. 
4.1.3 System Testing 
System testing is done to verify the full Avionics Software Platform running on 
multiple flight computers. Different versions of the Avionics Software Subsystem layer 
are created to set up the relevant test conditions. Two system-level tests were run to 
verify the Platform. 
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4.1.3.1 LED Platform Test 
The first system test designed was the LED Avionics Software Platform Test. 
This test defines the simplest Subsystem layer required to exercise every Platform feature 
in the nominal case. 
The test setup uses four flight computers (one Control Node and three Device 
Nodes), a ground computer (Ground Node), an Ethernet switch connecting the five 
nodes, and 11 LED’s (Figure 4). Five LED’s were connected to Device Node 0, one for 
each state the test will move through. These LED’s are managed by control logic running 
on the Control Node that checks the system state and turns on the corresponding LED. 
Five LED’s were also connected to Device Node 1. When in a specific system state, these 
LED’s light up sequentially. Finally, there is one LED connected to Device Node 2. This 
LED is managed by control logic running on Device Node 2, which commands the LED 
to flash at 1Hz. 
To interface with each LED a device driver was created that can be commanded 
to set a digital I/O pin high or low. The driver also reads the current actual state of the 
digital I/O pin (high or low) to provide feedback to the control logic. This allows the 
control logic to verify that a pin value was successfully set. 
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Figure 4: LED Platform System Test Setup. 
The state machine for the LED test is shown in Figure 5. State A is the initial 
state. The only action in this state is to enable the control logic managing the Device 
Node 0 LED’s, which results in StateALED turning on. The system then remains in State 
A until the LAUNCH command is received from the Ground Node, which initiates a 
transition to State B. In State B the system loops until three seconds have elapsed at 
which point a transition flag is set to true. This initiates a transition to State C. In State C 
the control logic managing the LED’s connected to Device Node 1 is enabled. This 
control logic sequentially turns the five LED’s on over five seconds. After the last LED 
(LED4) is enabled, LED4’s feedback value should now read true. After this occurs the 
system transitions to State D. In State D the control logic running on Device Node 2 is 
enabled. This results in FlashLED flashing at 1Hz. Once the system receives the ABORT 
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command from the Ground Node, the system transitions to State E. In State E only the 
state LED control logic is left enabled, so the only LED to remain on is StateELED. 
Figures 6-10 show pictures of the system as it moves through the system’s five states. 
 
 
Figure 5: LED Platform System Test State Machine. 
 
Figure 6: LED Platform System Test State A. 
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Figure 7: LED Platform System Test State B. 
 
Figure 8: LED Platform System Test State C. 
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Figure 9: LED Platform System Test State D. 
 
Figure 10: LED Platform System Test State E. 
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After running the LED System Test, the telemetry log on the Ground Node was 
inspected. The log showed the system progressed as expected and ended in the correct 
final state. No software errors, message drops, or deadline misses occurred. 
4.1.3.2 Recovery Igniter Test 
The second system test to verify the Platform was the Recovery Igniter Test. The 
Recovery Subsystem layer software was developed by the Avionics Software Integration 
team in partnership with the Recovery team. The Recovery Igniter Test was designed to 
verify the Recovery igniter software and hardware integration with the Avionics Software 
Platform. The test ran on three flight computers (one Control Node and two Device 
Nodes) and one ground computer. Control logic running on the Control Node sends an 
ignition command to the Device Nodes. Redundant control logic running on each of the 
Device Nodes checks the command against a set of safety rules before signaling to the 
igniter device driver to set a digital output pin to high. The output pin is connected to the 
igniter circuit, which converts the digital signal to the required current to actuate the 
igniter. The test successfully ignited black powder, which is the parachute deployment 
mechanism on the rocket. Figure 11 shows the flight computer setup, Figure 12 shows the 




Figure 11: Recovery Igniter System Test Flight Computer Setup. 
 
Figure 12: Recovery Igniter System Test Igniter Setup. 
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Figure 13: Recovery Igniter System Test Ignition Success. 
4.2 PERFORMANCE 
The key performance metrics for the system are network reliability, jitter when 
control logic runs each loop, reaction time of the system, the maximum number of 
sensors and actuators supported by the software, and the Platform CPU overhead.   
4.2.1 Network Reliability 
To measure network reliability the Platform was run across four flight computers 
(one Control Node and three Device Nodes) with the maximum allowed message sizes 
over a 24-hour period. The number of delayed or dropped messages was then measured. 
Over the 24-hour period, approximately 52 million messages were sent between flight 
computers. Of these messages, 2 were delayed and 1 was dropped, resulting in a network 
reliability of 99.999994%. Neither the data synchronization deadline nor the 10ms loop 
deadline was ever missed. 
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4.2.2 Jitter 
Jitter was measured to understand the timing reliability on each node. Ideally the 
control logic would run exactly every 10ms. However, variability in network timing and 
CPU scheduling results in slight timing changes each run. To measure jitter control logic 
was run on each node. This control logic read the current time and compared it to the 
previous time it ran. The measured jitter is shown in Figure 14 for the control logic 
running on the Control Node and Figure 15 for the control logic running on the Device 
Nodes. 
 
Figure 14: Control Node Jitter. 
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Figure 15: Device Node Jitter. 
The timeseries data and aggregated results (Table 2) show that the maximum jitter 
for control logic running on any node is 265us. This is a maximum variability of 2.7% on 
the 10ms loop. The jitter is about twice as high for logic running on Device Nodes as 
compared to logic running on the Control Node. This is because the Control Node loop 
starts based on a hardware timer, whereas the Device Node loops start when they receive 
a network message from the Control Node. Dependency on the network introduces more 







 Control Node Device Node 0 Device Node 1 Device Node 2 
Avg Jitter 2.8 us 14.4 us 18.6 us 19.9 us 
Max Jitter 123.8 us 251.3 us 228.8 us 265.2 us 
Max Jitter  
(% of Loop) 
1.2% 2.5% 2.3% 2.7% 
Table 2: Platform Jitter Results. 
One edge case not captured here is when a message from the Control Node to the 
Device Node is dropped. This will cause an additional spike jitter in the Device Node. 
Discussions with the subsystem teams concluded that the jitter both in the nominal case 
and during the occasional message drop is acceptable. 
4.2.3 Reaction Time 
Reaction time is defined as the time between new sensor data being read and an 
updated actuator value being written based on the new sensor data. While the sensor and 
actuator device drivers run on the Device Node connected to the sensor and actuator 
hardware, the control logic that uses the sensor data and provides an updated actuator 
value may not. If all sensors and actuators used by the control logic are connected to a 
single Device Node, the control logic can run on that same Device Node. Otherwise, the 
control logic must run on the Control Node, which has access to all sensors and actuators 
connected to the entire system. When control logic is running on a Device Node, the 
system reaction time is extremely fast as there is no dependency on sensors or actuators 
running on other nodes. For control logic running on the Control Node, the reaction time 
is slower as the sensor and actuator data must be communicated between nodes.  
The minimum possible reaction time for both scenarios was measured by running 
control logic on the Control Node and each Device Node with no other logic running. 
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The average was calculated by assuming the full 10ms software loop was being used on 
each node, with reading sensors, running control logic, and writing actuators taking up 
equal parts of the loop. The maximum was calculated based on the worst case scenario 
that a network message was dropped (Table 3). 
 
 Control Node Device Node 
Min Rxn Time 20.29 ms .08 ms 
Avg Rxn Time 25 ms 5 ms 
Max Rxn Time 40 ms 10 ms 
Table 3: Platform Reaction Time Results. 
4.2.4 Maximum Number of Sensors and Actuators 
The Platform is required to support up to 100 sensors and 100 actuators. Meeting 
this requirement is dependent on three factors: 
1. Sufficient network bandwidth to synchronize the sensor and actuator data between 
the Device Nodes and the Control Nodes each loop. 
2. Sufficient physical I/O available across the flight computers. 
3. Sufficient CPU time to read and write the sensors and actuators 
With respect to network bandwidth, assuming each sensor and actuator requires 
an average of 64 bits of data, the required network bandwidth is 1.3 Mbps ((100 sensors + 
100 actuators) x 64 bits x 100 loops per second). The Platform supports a maximum of 
49.15 kilobits of data to be transferred between flight computers each 10ms loop. With 
100 loops per second the Platform supports a network bandwidth of 4.9 Mbps. This 
satisfies the network bandwidth requirement to support 100 sensors and 100 actuators. 
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With respect to physical I/O the four flight computers together have 112 digital 
I/O pins, 64 analog in pins, 16 analog out pins, and 12 serial ports readily available. 
While this technically means the Platform meets the requirement with 204 sensors and 
actuators supported directly by the flight computers, meeting the subsystem needs is 
dependent on the types of sensors and actuators selected. For example, if the subsystems 
required 100 analog in sensors, the Platform would require some modification to meet the 
requirement (e.g. adding a multiplexer). Similarly, if all analog input signals required 
differential rather than RSE support, an analog differential to RSE converter card would 
be needed. However, given the current breakdown of subsystem sensor and actuator 
types, the Platform supports the rocket’s physical I/O needs. 
With respect to the CPU time requirement there are four types of sensor and 
actuator signals used on the rocket: digital, analog, I2C, and serial (RS-232). All digital 
and analog I/O reads and writes go through the FPGA, which is accessed via direct reads 
and writes to memory. This means each access only takes a handful of microseconds. 
Profiling of the reads and writes shows the average access time is about 3us. The I2C 
protocol is also implemented using the FPGA. The protocol runs asynchronously and 
writes results to memory, which are then read by the CPU. So any hardware devices 
using I2C also require only a few microseconds of CPU time to read or write. Finally, the 
rocket requires three serial devices. Since all other sensors and actuators require so little 
CPU, even if each serial device took a full millisecond to read or write, there would be 
plenty of CPU time across the flight computers to support the sensors. The Platform 
therefore supports the CPU time required to read and write up to 100 sensors and 100 
actuators.  
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4.2.5 CPU Overhead 
While the Avionics Software Platform provides critical functionality to the 
Avionics Software Subsystem layer, the Platform must also minimize its CPU footprint 
so that the Subsystem layer has plenty of time to run the rocket’s control logic and device 
drivers. The Platform’s overhead was measured by implementing control logic that 
increases its spin time each loop until the 10ms deadline is missed. 
CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID was used to measure the amount of actual CPU time 
the control logic was able to use before a deadline was missed. The Platform’s CPU 
overhead per node was then derived (Table 4). 
 
 Control Node Device Node 
Max Time Control Logic Ran Before Deadline Miss 7.85 ms 9.89 ms 
Platform CPU Overhead 21.5% 1.1% 
Table 4: Platform Overhead Results. 
With the four flight computers (one Control Node and three Device Nodes), every 
loop there is 40ms of CPU time to dedicate to the Platform and Subsystem layers. Across 
all flight computers, the Platform uses 2.48ms of this 40ms time per loop. This results in 
an overall Platform CPU overhead of 6.2%. Almost all of this overhead is used to 
synchronize data across nodes. 
4.3 REQUIREMENTS VERIFICATION 
The Avionics Software Platform tests and performance measurements were used 
to verify the system’s requirements. Each requirement and corresponding verification 
strategy and status are shown in Table 5. All but the final requirement have been verified. 
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The final requirement requires a static analysis tool integration and for any identified 
issues to be addressed before verification can be complete. 
 
Requirement Verification Strategy Verification Status 
The flight software shall 
be deterministic. 
• Code Review 
• Unit & Integration 
Testing 
Pass: Verified in code review. All 
unit and integration tests pass 
deterministically. 
Network reliability shall 
be at least 99.999% in 
the nominal case. 
• System Profiling 
Pass: 99.999994% from network 
reliability measurements. 
The flight software shall 
have a reaction time of 
no more than 50ms for 
high-level control logic 
and 10ms for low-level 
control logic. 
• System Profiling 
Pass: 40ms & 10ms maximums 
calculated, respectively, from system 
reaction time measurements. 
The flight software shall 
run control logic and 
hardware drivers at a 
frequency of 100Hz. 
• Integration & 
System Testing 
• System Profiling 
Pass: Verified in integration and 
system testing as well as system 
profiling where no loop deadlines 
were missed. 
The flight software shall 
support up to 100 
sensors and 100 
actuators. 
• System Profiling 
Pass: Required network bandwidth, 
physical I/O, and CPU time for 
sensors and actuators met. 
The flight software shall 
support configurable 
system states. 
• Unit, Integration, 
& System Testing 
Pass: Verified in unit tests, 
integration tests, and LED System 
Test. 
The flight software shall 
support user-
commanded, time-based, 
and flight data-based 
state transitions. 
• Unit, Integration, 
& System Testing 
Pass: Verified in unit tests, 
integration tests, and LED System 
Test. 
 




The flight software shall 
provide a mechanism for 
streaming snapshots of 
the rocket's state with a 
latency of no more than 
30ms. 
• Integration & 
System Testing 
• System Profiling 
Pass: Verified in integration tests, 
LED System Tests, and system 
profiling scripts, where telemetry is 
sent to Ground Node every loop with 
a nominal latency of up to 10ms 
(20ms if a telemetry message is 
dropped). 
All flight software shall 
detect and handle all 
software errors such that 
the system transitions to 
a predefined state. 
• Code Review 
• Unit & Integration 
& System Testing 
• Static Analysis 
In Progress: Verified error handling 
pattern followed during code review 
and testing. Requires static analysis 
to complete verification. 
Table 5: Platform Requirements Verification Status. 
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Chapter 5: Future Work 
Halcyon is currently scheduled to launch in May 2021. With the most recent 
iteration of Avionics Software Platform complete, the Avionics Software team has shifted 
focus on developing the Avionics Software Subsystem layer, a hardware-in-the-loop test 
platform for testing and qualifying the full avionics software system, and a mission 
control system for operators to interface with the rocket. However, the Platform will 
continue to be iterated on based on continual feedback from testing and subsystem 
integrations. In particular, there are four areas that will be worked on before the 2021 
launch. 
5.1 OPERATOR COMMAND RULE SYSTEM 
The Platform’s software to support operator commands will currently execute any 
provided command. This is problematic because it exposes the rocket to operator error 
and would allow an operator to command the rocket during flight, which is not permitted 
by the range officers that provide oversight of rocket launches. A configurable rule 
system is therefore being developed. Depending on the state the rocket is in, commands 
will need to be whitelisted to be considered valid. 
5.2 CONTROL LOGIC OFF MODE 
Ground operators have a need to have complete control of the rocket’s actuators 
in some pre-launch procedures (e.g. manually controlling actuators during fueling). The 
current implementation of the Platform facilitates this by providing operators with direct 
command of actuators. However, manually written actuator commands may conflict with 
automated control logic. While this conflict can be handled in the Subsystem layer, a 
cleaner and more scalable solution is to resolve this conflict in the Platform layer. 
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5.3 STATIC ANALYSIS 
A static analysis tool will be integrated to further verify the flight software. In 
particular a static analysis tool will be used to surface unhandled exceptions and verify 
that the flight software follows the established safety-critical coding guidelines. 
5.4 TOLERATING AN UNRESPONSIVE FLIGHT COMPUTER 
During the Platform development a flight computer failed. The board powered off 
suddenly and could not be powered back on. While this was the only board failure seen 
across four flight computers over a 12-month period, this type of failure during flight 
would be catastrophic to the rocket. The root cause determined by National Instruments 
was an electrical component failure, which allowed 12V into a 1.8V power circuit 
causing the board to be unable to be powered on. This type of manufacturing issue, which 
occurred after months of successful usage of the board, would be very difficult to prevent 
or predict. 
Future iterations of the Platform will likely tolerate an unresponsive flight 
computer. The current design in the works is to use a primary/backup model, which 
would cost less in terms of weight than a 3-string solution. Since the Platform has plenty 
of I/O and CPU available to the rocket, one possible design is to repurpose the four flight 
computer roles so that there is a primary Control Node and Device Node pair and a 
backup pair. This would allow the system to tolerate a single node becoming 
unresponsive without adding nodes to the rocket.  
Since the Platform currently sends the rocket’s state to the Ground Node via 
telemetry, maintaining state in a backup pair would be trivial, as the primary pair could 
send the rocket’s state to the backup pair as well. This synchronization step would also be 
used to detect a primary failure. If the state is not sent after some timeout, the backup 
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would know the primary had failed. To protect against false positive failure detection, the 
backup would kill power to the primary. The backup node would then initialize its 
software components to run based on the most recently saved state. Some Platform 
components would need to be updated to support mid-flight initialization. 
The trickiest part to the primary/backup model is transitioning control to the 
backups. There are many edge cases depending on the exact timing of the failure. For 
example, what if the primary Control Node sends an actuator command to the primary 
Device Node and then dies before the backup Control Node receives the updated state? Is 
it ok if the backup Control Node resends the command? These types of cases would need 
to be thoroughly evaluated to determine the desired system behavior and how to modify 
the Platform to accomplish this desired behavior. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The Texas Rocket Engineering Lab is on track to launch Halcyon to the Karman 
Line in 2021, with the Avionics Software Platform providing a distributed flight software 
system that delivers data handling, control logic abstractions, thread scheduling, time 
management, and software error handling functionality. The Platform delivers this 
functionality using a configurable, scalable, and modular architecture that is designed to 
be easily tested and modified. The Platform executes control logic and device drivers at 
100Hz with a network reliability of 99.999994%, an average jitter of 2.2%, an average 
system reaction time of 5ms for control logic running on Device Nodes and 25ms for 
control logic running on the Control Node, and support for over 100 sensors and 
actuators. This functionality and performance is delivered by the Avionics Software 
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